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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is 
an Appeal from a final order of the Third District Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. DID THE LOWER COURT MAKE A FINDING THAT THE MONEY 
TRANSFERRED OVERSEAS, IN AUGUST OF 1991, HAD A VALUE OF 
$870,000.00 AT THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
2. COULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE MADE A FINDING, AT THE 
TIME OF TRIAL, CONCERNING THE VALUE OF THE MONEY 
TRANSFERRED OVERSEAS IN AUGUST 1991. 
3. CAN THE COURT AT THE TIME OF A REMAND HEARING MAKE A 
NEW FINDING WITHOUT NEW EVIDENCE. 
COMES NOW, the Appellant, Larry R. Perkins and moves this Honorable Court for 
reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum Decision, or in the alternative requests the Court 
grant him oral argument in the matter. This Motion is brought pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellant Procedure concerning petitions for re-hearing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Larry R. Perkins appealed to this Court a final Order in the form of a 
Decree of Divorce, rendered by the Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis of the Third Judicial 
District Court below. His brief on appeal was filed the 31st of January, 1994, the Respondent 
filed a responsive brief, and the Appellant filed a reply. 
This Court had the matter under advisement, and the parties awaited an invitation for oral 
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argument. The Court apparently decided the case on its own Motion, pursuant to Rule 31 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure apparently deciding that the matter had uncomplicated 
factual issues, or uncomplicated issues of law as described in Rule 31(b) Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure. The Memorandum Decision was filed, and mailed to counsel, April 13, 1995. 
In its memorandum decision that Court stated that "the trial Court identified as marital 
property $870,000.00 received from the sale of apartments." The Court further stated in its 
memorandum decision "based on its findings, the trial Court was able to identify marital assets 
of at least $1,405,806.00." 
The distinction the Appellant wishes to point out is the difference between the value of 
a marital asset eighteen (18) months before trial and the court's inability to make a finding 
concerning the same money at the time of trial. The trial court did identify $870,000 in marital 
property sent overseas to pay a mortgage obligation eighteen (18) months before trial. The 
lower court however, specifically did not make a finding as to the value of any money overseas 
at the time of trial, because it could not. The Respondent had the burden of establishing that 
value at trial, and did not attempt to do so. The lower court correctly concluded that it could 
not make a finding as to the value of any overseas asset. 
This Court agreed with the Appellant that the Findings of Fact published by the Court 
below did not support the outcome, and remanded the matter for trial. This Court however, in 
footnote number one to its decision, invites the District Court, if it cannot support its current 
disproportionate award with new findings, to simply let Mrs. Perkins retain the domestic assets 
previously awarded her, and give her a smaller fractional share of the overseas assets, upon 
which a value has never been placed. Such a suggestions, as currently contained in footnote one 
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of the memorandum decision, compounds, rather than solves, the problem. 
The Appellant asserts in this petition for re-hearing, or reconsideration that the Court has 
overlooked or misapprehended the nature of the dispute, the facts surrounding what the lower 
Court actually found, and did not find, and the law involved. 
The Appellant asserts that the lower Court did not value the marital estate at 
$1,405,806.00, and specifically that the Trial Court could not, and did not attach any value to 
any overseas assets. Appellant asserts that the lower court correctly did not do so in that there 
was no evidence presented at the time of trial as to those assets' value, if any. 
The Appellant agrees and accepts all other portions of the Court's memorandum decision. 
The Appellant requests that the Court reconsider this, and reissue an amended 
memorandum decision, or in the alternative, allow the parties oral argument in the matter. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court absolutely did not, and could not, make a finding at the time of trial 
as to the value of the money earlier transferred to the Singapore Corporation. The Court made 
a finding that the $870,000.00 was transferred overseas in August of 1991. The appellant's 
testimony, as is contained in the transcript, was that this money was sent to Yen Yang 
Corporation, a Singapore Corporation, to pay off the mortgage owed on the Royal Garden 
Apartments. Documents were produced at trial showing that the money had been borrowed to 
buy the apartments, a promissory note signed, and that a subsequent mortgage was recorded in 
Salt Lake County, securing the lender corporation. This testimony was unrefuted. 
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In paragraph nineteen (19) of its Findings of Fact, the lower court found that the 
appellant's testimony was lacking in credibility, that he controlled the Singapore corporation, 
and that the court could not put a value on the corporation for lack of evidence. The court 
found that the reason that there was a lack of evidence was because the Appellant was hiding 
assets. The court make no finding as to what efforts the Plaintiff/Respondent made to discover 
the truth about this issue, or what the Appellant had done to hide them. The lower court simply 
found that the Appellant was not a credible witness. 
The appellant vigorously denied any ownership or control in the Singapore corporation. 
Without regard for the reasons why, there was simply no evidence at trial to support a finding 
concerning the value of any alleged overseas asset of the parties. 
The lower court did not make a finding that the Singapore corporation had $870,000.00, 
or had any value at the time of trial, or that the Appellant had gotten any of the money. There 
was absolutely no evidence presented at the time of trial as to what the Company's financial 
condition was, or if it existed. The Respondent, before trial, sought and obtained two (2) 
extensions of time in which to do overseas discovery, and then did none. This is uncontroverted. 
The Plaintiff/Respondent, instead relief on her hope that the lower court, if it disbelieved the 
Appellant, and found him to be a liar, would be tempted to, and would in fact, exceed its 
authority, and attempt to punish him for lying, by granting the Respondent a disproportionate 
share of the estate. 
This Court, in its memorandum decision, has suggested to the District Court that if no 
new findings can be made, it can simply rest on its initial findings, but take away from the 
Plaintiff her one-half share of foreign assets, and that this will solve the problem. This will not 
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solve the problem. Without new evidence, which will support findings concerning the value of 
overseas assets at the time of trial, the trial Court will be in no better position to make adequate 
findings at a remand hearing, than it was originally. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DID THE LOWER COURT MAKE A FINDING THAT THE MONEY 
TRANSFERRED OVERSEAS, IN AUGUST OF 1991, HAD A VALUE OF 
$870,000.00 AT THE TIME OF TRIAL? 
The answer to this question is clearly no. The Court's findings on this issue were 
contained in Findings no. eighteen (18) and nineteen (19) which stated "Sale of the Royal 
Garden. In August 1991 Defendant sold his interest in the Royal Garden Apartments for 
$1,000,000.00 and transferred $870,000.00 overseas to Singapore." Finding No. 19 states that 
Defendant's Overseas Assets. Although the Defendant testified that he had no 
overseas assets and that the $870,000.00 in proceeds from the sale of the Royal 
Garden Apartments was transferred by him to Singapore to pay a debt he owed 
Yen Yang Shipping Company, the Court finds Defendant's testimony to be 
lacking in credibility on this point. The Court carefully listed to the totality of 
the testimony, considered Defendant's appearance and demeanor to arrive at this 
finding. The Court heard and considered the testimony of Kay Jones McDonald 
concerning Defendant's relationship with Yen Yang Shipping Company. The 
Court finds that Ms. McDonald was a very credible witness and clearly testified 
that Yen Yang was his based on her observations in Singapore when she was with 
the Defendant. The Court has also considered Exhibit 40 which it finds 
significant in arriving at this finding. 
From documents introduced into evidence, (including Exhibit 40), and 
from the testimony of witnesses at trial the Court finds that the Defendant 
currently has undetermined but substantial assets overseas which are under his 
control and which he is hiding from Plaintiff and this Court. Defendant's denial 
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of the existence of these assets is not credible. The Court further rules that the 
Plaintiff should be awarded one-half of the Defendant's overseas assets, the exact 
dollar amount to be determined when and if such information becomes available. 
[Emphasis added] 
Three things are undeniable with regard to the above two referred to findings: 
1. The trial Court thought the Appellant was a liar; 
2. The lower Court believed that the $870,000.00 mortgage debt owed on the 
Apartments, was owed to a Company in Singapore which Appellant controlled; and, 
3. That there was no evidence before the Court upon which it could base a finding as 
to the then value, that is, the value at the time of trial of the previously transferred $870,000. 
For this reason, the lower Court awarded the Respondent one-half of the unvalued, 
unquantifiable assets. 
Appellant denied that he had any interest or control in the Singapore Company to which 
the $870,000.00 mortgage was paid. A former girlfriend of Larry Perkins, Kay Jones 
McDonald testified at trial that she had been to Singapore with Larry on a trip, and that she 
could tell that Larry had control of the Singapore Corporation. The Court disbelieved Larry 
Perkins, and believed Kay Jones McDonald. 
The Appellant's point in this Motion for re-hearing or reconsideration of the 
memorandum decision is that Judge Lewis knew that there was no evidence before her as to the 
value of those monies on the date of trial. Not a shred of evidence was presented concerning 
the mortgage monies and what had happened to them after being paid to the Singapore Company 
to retire the mortgage debt the parties had owed. The lower Court was correctly concerned that 
it knew nothing of the mortgage company's debt structure, investors identities, shares 
outstanding, financial condition, cash on hand, or any other information which would allow it 
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to put a value on this corporation the Appellant was found to control. 
The lower Court, obviously suspected that there could be a large amount of money sitting 
overseas over which the Defendant/Appellant had control, but there simply no basis upon which 
the Court could value it. The fact that the asset had a dollar value of $870,000.00 eighteen (18) 
months earlier, in August, 1991, did not help the lower Court in making a finding as to its value 
some eighteen months later, in February, 1993 when the trial took place. 
This Court's memorandum decision, in footnote one, suggests that the problem of the 
Court's findings can be remedied by simply taking away one-half of the overseas assets from 
Respondent, and otherwise leave the property distribution as it is. This does not solve the 
fundamental problem of valuation of assets at the time of trial, and relieves the 
Plaintiff/Respondent of her legal burden of establishing value. 
The Trial Court's disbelief of Appellant's position does not abrogate the requirements of 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or the case law requiring specific findings as to 
value. Appellant asserts that the rule of law is that the marital assets must have their value 
established at the time of trial.1 The court cannot, as a matter of law, give one party 
unidentified assets of no known value, to make up for the award to the other party of assets of 
known value. The trial court cannot guesstimate, or adopt an "who cares" attitude, about this 
rule of law because it finds a witness to be lacking in credibility. There must be specific 
1
 Acton v. Deliran, 111 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987); Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 
1985); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233 
(Utah 1983); Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 
684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Rappeleye v. Rappeleye, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); 
Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 
1986). 
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findings as to value, and evidence to support them. The Plaintiff/Respondent simply did not 
meet her burden in this regard. 
II. COULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE MADE A FINDING, AT THE 
TIME OF TRIAL, CONCERNING THE VALUE OF THE MONEY 
TRANSFERRED OVERSEAS IN AUGUST 1991? 
The Trial Court could not have made a finding regarding the value of the property held 
overseas. It could not do this because there was no evidence presented at trial regarding the 
value of overseas assets. 
The only evidence presented at trial was that in August 1991 the Defendant sold an 
apartment complex in Salt Lake City, and sent $870,000 of the proceeds to pay off a recorded 
mortgage indebtedness. The evidence on this point was not disputed. What was disputed was 
whether or not the Appellant had control over the Singapore corporation holding the debt. 
Regardless of who controlled or owned that company, no evidence was ever presented as to the 
value of that company. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Appellant did control the Singapore corporation, that does 
not mean that he owned the company, or that it was worth $870,000 at the time of trial. Value 
cannot be determined without an examination of the assets, debts, accounts payable, and/or 
accounts receivable of a company. The trial court did not do this assessment as there was 
absolutely no evidence presented regarding those aspects of the "company." 
The lower court understood that just because the Appellant's ex-girlfriend said he 
controlled the company did not mean that he could take money from the company in any manner 
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he wished. Assuming that the Appellant did control the company, there is a substantial 
difference between having control of a company's operations, and having the ability to take 
assets from it, which could leave it with necessary liquid assets to meet its obligations. 
The lower court could not make a finding as to the value at trial because the Respondent 
failed to meet her burden of providing any evidence on that issue. 
To allow the trial court, on remand, to simply give the Appellant back his former wife's 
one-half share of overseas assets, without making specific findings as to the value of those 
assets, is to suggest to the lower court that it is free to arbitrarily, and capriciously, make 
unsupported assumptions about the value of the Singapore corporation. This is the equivalent 
of saying the Appellant lied at trial, therefore, the requirements of Rule 52, U.R.C.P., and the 
case law, are suspended. Such an approach is not an appropriate remedy for perceived perjury. 
This is contrary to established Utah law which requires court's to make specific findings 
as to value, and not base the distribution of property on the trial court's impressions of the 
parties. 
HI. CAN THE COURT AT THE TIME OF A REMAND HEARING MAKE A 
NEW FINDING WITHOUT NEW EVIDENCE. 
The trial court cannot make any new findings on remand because there was not sufficient 
evidence adduced at trial to allow the trial court to make those necessary findings. The burden 
was on the Plaintiff/Respondent to produce the necessary evidence. She failed to do this. Not 
only did the Plaintiff/Respondent fail to produce the evidence, she also failed to attempt to do 
any overseas discovery, not even a phone call. This fact was undisputed. The Plaintiff was 
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granted two discovery extensions to perform overseas discovery. Even then she failed to do any 
discovery. 
In order to give the trial court the necessary evidence, the Plaintiff/Respondent must 
fulfill the obligation placed in her by law to conduct discovery and present the evidence found 
at a remand hearing. 
A possible solution to this dilemma is to divide equally the known assets, also known as 
the domestic assets. Then also divide equally any overseas assets. In this manner, the marital 
estate would be divided equally. Neither party would bear the risk of a mistaken assumption 
about value. This court could further allow the Plaintiff/Respondent a new discovery period 
prior to a remand hearing in order to ensure that she is not in any way prohibited from 
discovering all possible information. 
Given these protections, the court would do all it could to give the Plaintiff/Respondent 
her one-half share of the marital estate and still require that she meet her burden as to the 
evidence. It would also grant to the Appellant his equitable share of the marital property and 
not cut him off from receiving one-half of the overall marital estate just because the trial court 
took and instant dislike to him. 
It is better that the Respondent be allowed to do discovery prior to hearing on remand, 
even though untimely, and another chance to meet her burden, than to base a property 
distribution on suspicion and doubt, as opposed to evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
The suggestions made to the lower court in footnote number one (1) of its memorandum 
decision will not solve the problem. Awarding the Appellant all the overseas assets of any, will 
not correct the flaws in the lower court's findings. 
Without additional evidence, there will still be no basis to put a value on or make a 
finding concerning any overseas asset. As long as that asset remains unvalued as of the time 
of trial, no distribution, other than an equal distribution, can be supported as a matter of law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant requests that, as a solution to this problem, the Plaintiff/Respondent be given 
additional time to do overseas discovery prior to hearing on remand. If the Respondent still 
cannot produce sufficient evidence to support a finding as to value of overseas assets, the lower 
court should be directed to distribute the marital estate as follows: 
1. One-half of known domestic assets to each party; 
2. One-half of unknown, unquantifiable, assets to each party. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of May, 1995. 
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David A. McPhie 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
Counsel for the Appellant hereby certifies that this petition is presented in good faith, and 
not for purposes of delay. 
DATED this 2nd day of May, 1995. 
David A. McPhie 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I cause to be hand-delivered to Paul Felt, two copies of the 
Appellant's Petition for Reconsideration or Hearing, at his office located at Suite #400, #79 
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
DATED this 2nd day of May, 1995. 
David A. McPhie 
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of the memorandum decision, compounds, rather than solves, the problem. 
The Appellant asserts in this petition for re-hearing, or reconsideration that the Court has 
overlooked or misapprehended the nature of the dispute, the facts surrounding what the lower 
Court actually found, and did not find, and the law involved. 
The Appellant asserts that the lower Court did not value the marital estate at 
$1,405,806.00, and specifically that the Trial Court could not, and did not attach any value to 
any overseas assets. Appellant asserts that the lower court correctly did not do so in that there 
was no evidence presented at the time of trial as to those assets' value, if any. 
The Appellant agrees and accepts all other portions of the Court's memorandum decision. 
The Appellant requests that the Court reconsider this, and reissue an amended 
memorandum decision, or in the alternative, allow the parties oral argument in the matter. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court absolutely did not, and could not, make a finding at the time of trial 
as to the value of the money earlier transferred to the Singapore Corporation. The Court made 
a finding that the $870,000.00 was transferred overseas in August of 1991. The appellant's 
testimony, as is contained in the transcript, was that this money was sent to Yen Yang 
Corporation, a Singapore Corporation, to pay off the mortgage owed on the Royal Garden 
Apartments. Documents were produced at trial showing that the money had been borrowed to 
buy the apartments, a promissory note signed, and that a subsequent mortgage was recorded in 
Salt Lake County, securing the lender corporation. This testimony was unrefuted. 
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In paragraph nineteen (19) of its Findings of Fact, the lower court found that the 
appellant's testimony was lacking in credibility, that he controlled the Singapore corporation, 
and that the court could not put a value on the corporation for lack of evidence. The court 
found that the reason that there was a lack of evidence was because the Appellant was hiding 
assets. The court make no finding as to what efforts the Plaintiff/Respondent made to discover 
the truth about this issue, or what the Appellant had done to hide them. The lower court simply 
found that the Appellant was not a credible witness. 
The appellant vigorously denied any ownership or control in the Singapore corporation. 
Without regard for the reasons why, there was simply no evidence at trial to support a finding 
concerning the value of any alleged overseas asset of the parties. 
The lower court did not make a finding that the Singapore corporation had $870,000.00, 
or had any value at the time of trial, or that the Appellant had gotten any of the money. There 
was absolutely no evidence presented at the time of trial as to what the Company's financial 
condition was, or if it existed. The Respondent, before trial, sought and obtained two (2) 
extensions of time in which to do overseas discovery, and then did none. This is uncontroverted. 
The Plaintiff/Respondent, instead relief on her hope that the lower court, if it disbelieved the 
Appellant, and found him to be a liar, would be tempted to, and would in fact, exceed its 
authority, and attempt to punish him for lying, by granting the Respondent a disproportionate 
share of the estate. 
This Court, in its memorandum decision, has suggested to the District Court that if no 
new findings can be made, it can simply rest on its initial findings, but take away from the 
Plaintiff her one-half share of foreign assets, and that this will solve the problem. This will not 
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solve the problem. Without new evidence, which will support findings concerning the value of 
overseas assets at the time of trial, the trial Court will be in no better position to make adequate 
findings at a remand hearing, than it was originally. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DID THE LOWER COURT MAKE A FINDING THAT THE MONEY 
TRANSFERRED OVERSEAS, IN AUGUST OF 1991, HAD A VALUE OF 
$870,000.00 AT THE TIME OF TRIAL? 
The answer to this question is clearly no. The Court's findings on this issue were 
contained in Findings no. eighteen (18) and nineteen (19) which stated "Sale of the Royal 
Garden. In August 1991 Defendant sold his interest in the Royal Garden Apartments for 
$1,000,000.00 and transferred $870,000.00 overseas to Singapore." Finding No. 19 states that 
Defendant's Overseas Assets. Although the Defendant testified that he had no 
overseas assets and that the $870,000.00 in proceeds from the sale of the Royal 
Garden Apartments was transferred by him to Singapore to pay a debt he owed 
Yen Yang Shipping Company, the Court finds Defendant's testimony to be 
lacking in credibility on this point. The Court carefully listed to the totality of 
the testimony, considered Defendant's appearance and demeanor to arrive at this 
finding. The Court heard and considered the testimony of Kay Jones McDonald 
concerning Defendant's relationship with Yen Yang Shipping Company. The 
Court finds that Ms. McDonald was a very credible witness and clearly testified 
that Yen Yang was his based on her observations in Singapore when she was with 
the Defendant. The Court has also considered Exhibit 40 which it finds 
significant in arriving at this finding. 
From documents introduced into evidence, (including Exhibit 40), and 
from the testimony of witnesses at trial the Court finds that the Defendant 
currently has undetermined but substantial assets overseas which are under his 
control and which he is hiding from Plaintiff and this Court. Defendant's denial 
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of the existence of these assets is not credible. The Court further rules that the 
Plaintiff should be awarded one-half of the Defendant's overseas assets, the exact 
dollar amount to be determined when and if such information becomes available. 
[Em|±asisaddedj 
Three things are undeniable with regard to the above two referred to findings: 
1. The trial Court thought the Appellant was a liar; 
2. The lower Court believed that the $870,000.00 mortgage debt owed on the 
Apartments, was owed to a Company in Singapore which Appellant controlled; and, 
3. That there was no evidence before the Court upon which it could base a finding as 
to the then value, that is, the value at the time of trial of the previously transferred $870,000. 
For this reason, the lower Court awarded the Respondent one-half of the unvalued, 
unquantifiable assets. 
Appellant denied that he had any interest or control in the Singapore Company to which 
the $870,000.00 mortgage was paid. A former girlfriend of Larry Perkins, Kay Jones 
McDonald testified at trial that she had been to Singapore with Larry on a trip, and that she 
could tell that Larry had control of the Singapore Corporation. The Court disbelieved Larry 
Perkins, and believed Kay Jones McDonald. 
The Appellant's point in this Motion for re-hearing or reconsideration of the 
memorandum decision is that Judge Lewis knew that there was no evidence before her as to the 
value of those monies on the date of trial. Not a shred of evidence was presented concerning 
the mortgage monies and what had happened to them after being paid to the Singapore Company 
to retire the mortgage debt the parties had owed. The lower Court was correctly concerned that 
it knew nothing of the mortgage company's debt structure, investors identities, shares 
outstanding, financial condition, cash on hand, or any other information which would allow it 
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to put a value on this corporation the Appellant was found to control. 
The lower Court, obviously suspected that there could be a large amount of money sitting 
overseas over which the Defendant/Appellant had control, but there simply no basis upon which 
the Court could value it. The fact that the asset had a dollar value of $870,000.00 eighteen (18) 
months earlier, in August, 1991, did not help the lower Court in making a finding as to its value 
some eighteen months later, in February, 1993 when the trial took place. 
This Court's memorandum decision, in footnote one, suggests that the problem of the 
Court's findings can be remedied by simply taking away one-half of the overseas assets from 
Respondent, and otherwise leave the property distribution as it is. This does not solve the 
fundamental problem of valuation of assets at the time of trial, and relieves the 
Plaintiff/Respondent of her legal burden of establishing value. 
The Trial Court's disbelief of Appellant's position does not abrogate the requirements of 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or the case law requiring specific findings as to 
value. Appellant asserts that the rule of law is that the marital assets must have their value 
established at the time of trial.1 The court cannot, as a matter of law, give one party 
unidentified assets of no known value, to make up for the award to the other party of assets of 
known value. The trial court cannot guesstimate, or adopt an "who cares" attitude, about this 
rule of law because it finds a witness to be lacking in credibility. There must be specific 
1
 Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987); Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 
1985); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233 
(Utah 1983); Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 
684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Rappeleye v. Rappeleye, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); 
Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 
1986). 
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findings as to value, and evidence to support them. The Plaintiff/Respondent simply did not 
meet her burden in this regard. 
II. COULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE MADE A FINDING, AT THE 
TIME OF TRIAL, CONCERNING THE VALUE OF THE MONEY 
TRANSFERRED OVERSEAS IN AUGUST 1991? 
The Trial Court could not have made a finding regarding the value of the property held 
overseas. It could not do this because there was no evidence presented at trial regarding the 
value of overseas assets. 
The only evidence presented at trial was that in August 1991 the Defendant sold an 
apartment complex in Salt Lake City, and sent $870,000 of the proceeds to pay off a recorded 
mortgage indebtedness. The evidence on this point was not disputed. What was disputed was 
whether or not the Appellant had control over the Singapore corporation holding the debt. 
Regardless of who controlled or owned that company, no evidence was ever presented as to the 
value of that company. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Appellant did control the Singapore corporation, that does 
not mean that he owned the company, or that it was worth $870,000 at the time of trial. Value 
cannot be determined without an examination of the assets, debts, accounts payable, and/or 
accounts receivable of a company. The trial court did not do this assessment as there was 
absolutely no evidence presented regarding those aspects of the "company." 
The lower court understood that just because the Appellant's ex-girlfriend said he 
controlled the company did not mean that he could take money from the company in any manner 
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he wished. Assuming that the Appellant did control the company, there is a substantial 
difference between having control of a company's operations, and having the ability to take 
assets from it, which could leave it with necessary liquid assets to meet its obligations. 
The lower court could not make a finding as to the value at trial because the Respondent 
failed to meet her burden of providing any evidence on that issue. 
To allow the trial court, on remand, to simply give the Appellant back his former wife's 
one-half share of overseas assets, without making specific findings as to the value of those 
assets, is to suggest to the lower court that it is free to arbitrarily, and capriciously, make 
unsupported assumptions about the value of the Singapore corporation. This is the equivalent 
of saying the Appellant lied at trial, therefore, the requirements of Rule 52, U.R.C.P., and the 
case law, are suspended. Such an approach is not an appropriate remedy for perceived perjury. 
This is contrary to established Utah law which requires court's to make specific findings 
as to value, and not base the distribution of property on the trial court's impressions of the 
parties. 
in. CAN THE COURT AT THE TIME OF A REMAND HEARING MAKE A 
NEW FINDING WITHOUT NEW EVIDENCE. 
The trial court cannot make any new findings on remand because there was not sufficient 
evidence adduced at trial to allow the trial court to make those necessary findings. The burden 
was on the Plaintiff/Respondent to produce the necessary evidence. She failed to do this. Not 
only did the Plaintiff/Respondent fail to produce the evidence, she also failed to attempt to do 
any overseas discovery, not even a phone call. This fact was undisputed. The Plaintiff was 
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granted two discovery extensions to perform overseas discovery. Even then she failed to do any 
discovery. 
In order to give the trial court the necessary evidence, the Plaintiff/Respondent must 
fulfill the obligation placed in her by law to conduct discovery and present the evidence found 
at a remand hearing. 
A possible solution to this dilemma is to divide equally the known assets, also known as 
the domestic assets. Then also divide equally any overseas assets. In this manner, the marital 
estate would be divided equally. Neither party would bear the risk of a mistaken assumption 
about value. This court could further allow the Plaintiff/Respondent a new discovery period 
prior to a remand hearing in order to ensure that she is not in any way prohibited from 
discovering all possible information. 
Given these protections, the court would do all it could to give the Plaintiff/Respondent 
her one-half share of the marital estate and still require that she meet her burden as to the 
evidence. It would also grant to the Appellant his equitable share of the marital property and 
not cut him off from receiving one-half of the overall marital estate just because the trial court 
took and instant dislike to him. 
It is better that the Respondent be allowed to do discovery prior to hearing on remand, 
even though untimely, and another chance to meet her burden, than to base a property 
distribution on suspicion and doubt, as opposed to evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
The suggestions made to the lower court in footnote number one (1) of its memorandum 
decision will not solve the problem. Awarding the Appellant all the overseas assets of any, will 
not correct the flaws in the lower court's findings. 
Without additional evidence, there will still be no basis to put a value on or make a 
finding concerning any overseas asset. As long as that asset remains unvalued as of the time 
of trial, no distribution, other than an equal distribution, can be supported as a matter of law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant requests that, as a solution to this problem, the Plaintiff/Respondent be given 
additional time to do overseas discovery prior to hearing on remand. If the Respondent still 
cannot produce sufficient evidence to support a finding as to value of overseas assets, the lower 
court should be directed to distribute the marital estate as follows: 
1. One-half of known domestic assets to each party; 
2. One-half of unknown, unquantifiable, assets to each party. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of May, 1995. 
11 
ZLW>/2/^ ' 
David A. McPhie 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
Counsel for the Appellant hereby certifies that this petition is presented in good faith, and 
not for purposes of delay. 
DATED this 2nd day of May, 1995. 
/^t**^AAte&£. 
David A. McPhie 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I cause to be hand-delivered to Paul Felt, two copies of the 
Appellant's Petition for Reconsideration or Hearing, at his office located at Suite #400, #79 
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
DATED this 2nd day of May, 1995. 
t^-J+***-JA-M 
David A. McPhie 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COURT'S 
JERRI S. PERKINS, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
CASE NO. 914902826 
vs. : 
LARRY R. PERKINS, : 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on February 2, 3, 
and 4, and March 16, 1993 pursuant to notice, before the Honorable 
Leslie A. Lewis. Plaintiff was present in person and represented 
by counsel, Paul S. Felt, Defendant was present in person and 
represented by counsel, David A. McPhie. Each party made opening 
statements, and the Court then heard testimony and received 
exhibits and heard closing arguments of counsel. The Court now 
having fully considered the matter and reviewed the Exhibits 
received, its notes, and the proposed Findings from plaintiff and 
defendant, and good cause appearing, the Court now makes and enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Residency. Plaintiff and defendant were each residents 
of Salt Lake County, Utah for more than three months before the 
filing of this action. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
COURT'S 
JERRI S. PERKINS, : FINDINGS OP PACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
CASE NO. 914902826 
vs. : 
LARRY R. PERKINS, : 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on February 2, 3, 
and 4, and March 16, 1993 pursuant to notice, before the Honorable 
Leslie A. Lewis. Plaintiff was present in person and represented 
by counsel, Paul S. Felt, Defendant was present in person and 
represented by counsel, David A. McPhie. Each party made opening 
statements, and the Court then heard testimony and received 
exhibits and heard closing arguments of counsel. The Court now 
having fully considered the matter and reviewed the Exhibits 
received, its notes, and the proposed Findings from plaintiff and 
defendant, and good cause appearing, the Court now makes and enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Residency. Plaintiff and defendant were each residents 
of Salt Lake County, Utah for more than three months before the 
filing of this action. 
sJ 
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2. Marriage. Plaintiff and defendant were wife and husband, 
having been married in Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 3, 1969. 
8^3. Divorce. On February 4, 1993, the Court bifurcated this 
matter and granted a Decree of Divorce reserving all other issues 
for the trial. The plaintiff was awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
the defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. This 
Decree of Divorce reserving all other issues was signed by the 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on February 9, 1993. 
4. Custody and Visitation. The parties have three minor 
children born as issue of their marriage, to wit: , Jason R. 
Perkins, age 17; Patricia L. Perkins (Tricia), age 16; and Tawna 
Perkins, age 10. The parties have stipulated that plaintiff is a 
fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody and control 
of Jason and Tawna and that defendant is to have reasonable rights 
of visitation at all reasonable times and places provided that 
defendant shall give plaintiff reasonable notice prior to the 
exercise of such visitation rights and that the Court would meet 
with Tricia concerning custody and make a custody decision 
concerning Tricia that is binding upon the parties. Subject to the 
notice requirements, defendant's visitation rights are to at least 
meet those in the standard Third District Court schedule. The 
Court met with Tricia on the 7th day of April, 1993, and Tricia 
volunteered the following information: 
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"I kinda want to be both places. . .I'd like to be with 
my siblings more. I want to be able to be flexible. I 
want my Mom to get full child support because I may want 
to live with her fulltime soon. I can communicate better 
with my Mom. But I love them both." 
The Court finds after meeting with Tricia and considering all 
that she said to the Court, her age, and her demeanor, that she has 
no clear preference to live full-time with either parent at this 
point and desires to be able to spend time on a flexible basis with 
both parents. The Court finds that the parties have been able to 
effectively communicate and handle scheduling issues during the 
pendency of this action concerning Tricia. The Court therefore 
awards joint legal custody to the parties and physical custody to 
the plaintiff, subject to a liberal and flexible visitation 
schedule with the defendant, structured by plaintiff, defendant and 
Tricia. The Court in reaching this decision considered the 
placement of the siblings and the fact that the plaintiff has been 
the primary care-giver for the majority of Tricia's life and has 
exhibited an ability to communicate and parent effectively and a 
willingness to work with the defendant to effectuate a liberal, 
fair visitation schedule. 
5. Defendant's Education. The Court finds that defendant is 
highly educated with a bachelor's degree in accounting and 
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economics and a master's degree, and has received extensive work-
related education and experience in business, finance and banking. 
6. Defendant's Past Employment. The Court finds that 
defendant has been employed in the past in the fields of overseas 
banking, shipping and construction and has developed expertise in 
structuring investments and financial transactions in these areas. 
In the 1970's defendant was employed overseas in Indonesia and 
Greece and also made profitable personal investments in certain 
foreign companies. Plaintiff and defendant and their children 
lived overseas during most of the time defendant was employed by 
the First National Bank of Chicago in Indonesia and Greece and 
later by certain companies in Greece. 
7. The Parties' Return to the United States. In 1970, 
defendant and plaintiff returned to the United States to live. At 
that time, defendant left a substantial but {undetermined amount of 
money and other assets overseas when he moved back to the United 
States. After his return to the United States, defendant continued 
to have access and control over said overseas assets. The Court 
finds defendant has always had exclusive control over the overseas 
assets. 
8. Purchase of Marital Residence. Upon their return to the 
United States, the parties purchased a house in Salt Lake City on 
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4503 South Adonis Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah ("Adonis Drive 
House") which became the parties' residence. In 1990, the house 
was owned free and clear of any liens. In the early 1980's, the 
house was put solely in plaintiff's name. 
9. Parties' Lifestyle. During the 1980's and 1990, the 
parties and their family lived a very comfortable lifestyle 
enjoying an upper middle class standard of living which included 
adequate money for the necessities of life, and luxuries and 
included overseas and domestic trips, a large house in Olympus 
Cove, and enrichment opportunities for the children and parties. 
The Court found plaintiff very credible on this issue and did not 
find defendant credible on this issue. This lifestyle utilized 
only defendant's income and plaintiff's in-house contributions of 
time and energy to run the house and care for the family. 
10. Defendant's Employment During the 1980's. During the 
1980's defendant was employed primarily as the controller of Sales 
West Marketing. He also worked for periods of time as a consultant 
to other companies and had a financial interest in several other 
companies including Ionian Equipment Company, a Liberian 
corporation, Perperez Maritime Company, Ramona Enterprises and Apex 
Equipment Company. 
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11. Purchase of the Royal Garden Apartments. In the early 
1980's defendant purchased the Royal Garden Apartments in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. During the 1980's these apartments created a positive 
yearly cash flow which defendant utilized for family maintenance 
and spending, as well as his own business investments. Defendant 
filled out a financial statement for First Interstate Bank in April 
1987 which showed that the Royal Garden Apartments was providing 
him a cash flow of $40,000 per year. The Court further finds that 
the income tax returns filed by the parties from 1985 to 1992 and 
which were prepared exclusively by defendant may not accurately 
reflect all of the money which was available to the defendant and 
his family for their use. The parties' income tax returns are the 
only source document available from which to determine the amount 
of money available to defendant and his family. 
12. Defendant's Investments in the 1980's. During the 1980's 
defendant purchased and sold various pieces of real estate 
including an office building, and said investments were profitable 
in amounts which exceeded $150,000. Defendant received and 
utilized the profit on these investments. 
13. Plaintiff's Skills and Activities During the 1980's. 
Early in the marriage plaintiff was employed for a limited period 
of time as a sales clerk at the then existing minimum wage. 
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Plaintiff has one to two years of college credits, but has no 
college degree. For the past twenty years plaintiff has been 
unemployed and remained unemployed during the course of the 
marriage at defendant's request in order to be a homemaker and to 
care for the parties' children, including the parties' diabetic 
daughter, Tawna, and to be available to travel and to move at 
defendant's request. In so doing, plaintiff has foregone 
opportunities for her own educational and career advancement. 
Plaintiff currently has no meaningful job skills and is presently 
unemployable in a job above minimum wage. 
14. Defendant's Current Employment. The Court finds that 
defendant's income during 1992 was when he was employed as a 
mortgage broker for Utah First Mortgage was $39,590.54. Defendant 
continues to be employed in this capacity and testified that his 
income in the immediate future should be similar to his 1992 
income. 
15. Plaintiff's Current Income. The Court finds that 
plaintiff earned no wages or income during the last twenty years 
and only has a monthly unearned income if the dividends from the 
Merrill Lynch account number 222-0000-016182 and the IBM stock 
account number 14885-68530 are attributed to her. These dividends 
currently total approximately $232 per month. Plaintiff's income 
is further enhanced if the monthly payments on the Royal Garden 
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Note of $1#112 per month continue to be paid to plaintiff as 
ordered by the Court in its temporary order of support. 
16. Plaintiff/s Future Plans. The plaintiff has enrolled in 
a college nursing program and has testified she wants to obtain a 
degree as a registered nurse and can accomplish this by 1998. 
During the next five years the plaintiff has testified she will 
have to devote her full attention to caring for her family, 
including her diabetic daughter, and to her education and will not 
be able to be employed or have any meaningful earned income if she 
is to meet this goal. 
17. Separation of the Parties. In April, 1991, defendant 
told plaintiff that he no longer loved her or desired to be married 
to her and the parties separated. 
18. Sale of the Royal Garden Apartments. In August, 1991, 
defendant sold his interest in the Royal Garden Apartments for $1 
million and transferred $870,000 overseas to Singapore. 
19. Defendants Overseas Assets. Although the defendant 
testified that he had no overseas assets and that the $870,000 
proceeds from the sale of the Royal Garden Apartments was 
transferred by him to Singapore to pay a debt he owed Yen Yang 
Shipping Company, the Court finds defendants testimony to be 
lacking in credibility on this point. The Court carefully listened 
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to the totality of the testimony and considered defendant's 
appearance and demeanor carefully throughout to arrive at this 
finding. 
The Court heard and considered the testimony of Kay Jones 
McDonald concerning defendant's relationship with Yen Yang Shipping 
Company. The Court finds Ms. McDonald was a very credible witness 
and clearly testified that "Yen Yang was his (defendant's) 
corporation for his own use," based upon her observations in 
Singapore, when she was with the defendant. The Court has also 
considered Exhibit 40, which it finds significant, in arriving at 
this finding. 
From documents introduced into evidence (including Exhibit 
40) , and from the testimony of witnesses at the trial, the Court 
finds that defendant currently has undetermined but substantial 
assets overseas which are under his control and which he is hiding 
from plaintiff and this Court. Defendant's denial of the existence 
of these assets is not credible. The Court further rules that 
plaintiff should be awarded one-half of defendant's overseas 
assets, the exact dollar amount to be determined when and if such 
information becomes available. 
20. Plaintiff's Needs for the Next Five Years. The Court 
rules that, even absent a consideration of the overseas assets, the 
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division of assets as set forth in these Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law is necessary and reasonable because plaintiff 
and the minor children residing with her will need to spend much of 
the proceeds from these assets for their support and maintenance 
during the next five years while plaintiff is in school obtaining 
her nursing degree. These needs are detailed further in other 
paragraphs of these Findings of Fact. 
21. Child Support. Child support is to be calculated 
pursuant to and consistent with the Utah Child Support Guidelines 
based upon a consideration of all three children in plaintiff's 
physical custody. Defendant is presently employed as a mortgage 
broker with Utah First Mortgage. In 1992 defendant's payroll 
records reflected wages of $39,590.64 which equals $3,299.22 per 
month. Additionally, defendant makes $41 per month from a Merrill 
Lynch investment account for a total monthly wage of $3,340. As 
previously stated, plaintiff has no earned income and if the 
unearned income she has been receiving under the temporary support 
order is attributable to her, plaintiff's gross monthly income is 
$1,344. Child support is to be based upon these figures. The 
Court rules that based upon Section 74-45-1, the defendant should 
pay the sum of $183.17 per month per child for a total of $549.51 
per month for the support of the three children. However, if 
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Tricia resides with the defendant for more than fifty percent of 
the days of any month from the date of this ruling forward, a child 
support adjustment shall be made pursuant to statute. The Court 
further rules that, pursuant to Section 15-2-1, Utah Code Ann., 
because of her diabetes and anticipated medical needs, the 
defendant is ordered to pay child support for Tawna until she 
reaches the age of 21 years. 
22. Alimony. The Court finds that plaintiff's reasonable 
monthly expenses to maintain and educate herself and the two 
children living with her will be $2,917 after plaintiff sells the 
Adonis Drive House and purchases the house which she is now 
renting. The Court finds that plaintiff's claimed monthly expenses 
as set forth in Exhibit 162 are reasonable and necessary. The 
Court further finds that defendant has the ability to pay the sum 
of $500 per month in alimony, and this is to be paid for the next 
five years during which time plaintiff will be involved in 
education to enable her to contribute to her own needs. 
Thereafter, defendant is to pay plaintiff the sum of $300 per month 
as permanent alimony until she remarries or cohabits. The Court 
further finds that plaintiff and the children will need more money 
per month for their support than defendant has evinced the recent 
ability to pay in alimony and child support, and thus it is fair 
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and reasonable that plaintiff be awarded a larger share of the 
parties' domestic assets as hereinafter set forth. The Court in 
determining alimony has considered plaintiff's need, defendant's 
ability to pay, plaintiff's limited ability to earn, the standard 
of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage, defendant's 
significantly greater ability to increase his income in the future, 
given his education and work history, and the length of the 
marriage, as well as the other facts set forth herein. 
23. The Court rules that an Order to Withhold and Deliver be 
issued pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 62-11-401, et seq., 
should the defendant become thirty (30) days delinquent in any of 
his support obligations provided herein. 
24. Royal Garden Apartment Note. The Court rules that the 
plaintiff be awarded the proceeds of the Royal Garden Note which 
has a principal value of approximately $39,434 as of February, 
1993. The defendant assigned the proceeds of this Note to 
plaintiff after the date of separation and has consistently treated 
this Note as an asset belonging to plaintiff. 
25. Home Equity Loan. Beginning in 1991, the parties began 
borrowing on a home equity line of credit against the Adonis Drive 
House. The Court finds that plaintiff reasonably borrowed against 
this line of credit because she and the children needed the money 
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on which to live and to pay the monthly interest on the home equity 
loan. The Court further finds that some of defendant's borrowings 
against the home equity line of credit were not reasonable or 
necessary. This finding includes, but is not limited to the 
December 19, 1992 borrowing when defendant took $8,750 from the 
home equity line of credit and sent it overseas to Yen Yang 
Shipping Company. Thus, the Court finds that defendant, through 
his unjustified depletion of the home equity line of credit, has 
already taken an unjustifiable share of the equity from the Adonis 
Drive House. The home equity loan which must be paid to First 
Security Bank when the home is sold currently stands at $100,724 
when the interest payment for March, 1993 is included. Because the 
maximum loan amount the bank will allow is $100,000, which was 
reached in December, 1992, plaintiff has been forced to pay 
interest on the loan for January of $670.56, and February of 
$613.69 out of the last monies she borrowed from the home equity 
account. 
26. The Adonis Drive House. The house is currently subject 
to an earnest money agreement to be sold with a prospective closing 
date of March 31, 1993 at a price of $270,000. At the time of the 
anticipated sale, the home equity loan of $100,724 must be paid 
from the sales proceeds as well as real estate commissions totaling 
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$12,200 (of which defendant will receive $1,000), and unpaid 
property taxes of $5,233, leaving an equity of approximately 
$151,843. The Court finds that it is reasonable and proper based 
upon all of the foregoing facts and circumstances to award 
plaintiff seventy-five percent of the net equity from the sale of 
the Adonis Drive House and to award defendant twenty-five percent 
of said net equity. 
27. West Valley House. During the marriage the parties 
purchased a house in West Valley City, Utah as an investment and 
put the house in plaintiff's name. After the parties' separation, 
the house was sold and the proceeds from the sale were put in an 
interest bearing trust account which has a present value of 
$85,950.89. The Court rules that it is reasonable and proper to 
award plaintiff one hundred percent of the proceeds from the sale 
of the West Valley house. 
28. Plaintiff's Bank Accounts. Plaintiff currently has 
approximately $2,910 in a checking account which is the residual 
amount left from a $5,000 gift from plaintiff's mother. The Court 
rules it is reasonable and proper that plaintiff be awarded all 
interest in her bank account. 
29. Defendant's Bank Accounts. Defendant currently has 
approximately $2,500 in his bank accounts. The Court rules it is 
reasonable and proper that defendant be awarded all interest in his 
bank account. 
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30. Vehicles, Plaintiff owns a 1992 Nissan Pathfinder which 
she purchased for $22,000. The minor son is currently driving an 
old Cadillac with a value of approximately $1,000. There is a 1968 
Jaguar automobile which defendant represented in writing was owned 
by the plaintiff and which has the stipulated value of $27,000. 
Defendant owns a 1991 Ford Explorer with a value of $16,000. The 
Court rules it is reasonable and proper that plaintiff be awarded 
her Pathfinder and the Cadillac. The Court finds it is reasonable 
and proper that defendant be awarded his Ford Explorer and the 
Jaguar automobile, and the boat and trailer in defendant's 
possession, and that defendant is to pay plaintiff half the 
stipulated value of the Jaguar, before he can take possession of 
the same. 
31. Insurance Policies. There are life insurance policies in 
existence on the life of the defendant and each of the children 
with the following cash values: 
Defendant Larry Perkins $39,674 
Jason Perkins 2,502 
Tricia Perkins 2,405 
Tawna Perkins 3,504 
Lara Perkins (adult daughter) 4,294 
There is no life insurance policy on the life of the 
plaintiff. The Court rules that the financial needs of the 
plaintiff and the children are such that plaintiff will need the 
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cash surrender values to supplement the child support and alimony 
awarded to plaintiff and that neither of the parties can afford to 
pay the premiums which will be necessary to keep the insurance 
policies in effect. The Court rules that it is reasonable and 
proper for plaintiff to be awarded the above-described life 
insurance policies on the lives of the defendant, Lara, Jason and 
Tricia so she can utilize the cash surrender value to supplement 
her living expenses. However, the Court rules that the life 
insurance on the life of the diabetic daughter, Tawna, shall be 
maintained by the defendant, as it will be difficult for Tawna to 
procure insurance on her life in the future. 
32. Furniture and Personal Property. The Court approves the 
stipulation of the parties made at the beginning of the trial that 
each party shall retain the furniture, art objects and personal 
property now in their separate possession. 
33. Health Insurance. The Court orders defendant to maintain 
adequate health, accident, hospitalization and dental insurance on 
the parties' children. Defendant is ordered to pay all deductible 
amounts applicable to said insurance. Plaintiff and defendant are 
ordered to each pay one-half of all non-covered medical and dental 
expenses for the children until they reach the age of 18 years and 
to continue such payments beyond the age of 18 years if such health 
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insurance can be kept in effect as to the children if they are in 
school. Defendant is further ordered to make available to 
plaintiff health insurance at his place of employment under the 
COBRA laws if such is available through his employment, with 
plaintiff to pay the premiums on her own health insurance. 
34. Debts and Obligations of the Parties. The Court finds 
that, other than the home equity loan which will be paid out of 
proceeds from the sale of the Adonis Drive House, all post-
separation debts and obligations should be paid by the party which 
incurred the same. 
35. Defendant/s Investments. The Court rules that the 
Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account in the approximate amount of 
$485, the International Holdings Account in the approximate amount 
of $9,712 and the Pacific Fund A in the approximate amount of 
$10,710, all of which are in defendant's name, should be awarded to 
defendant. 
36. Defendant's Retirement. The Court rules that defendant's 
IRA account in the approximate amount of $20,269 should be awarded 
to defendant. The plaintiff has no compensating retirement 
account. 
37. The Children's Uniform Gift to Minors Account. During 
the course of their marriage, the parties established a Uniform 
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Gift to Minors Account in each of their children's names. The 
approximate amount of each account for the minor children is: 
Jason Perkins $12,575 
Tricia Perkins 17,575 
Tawna Perkins 12,080 
The Court rules that plaintiff shall have control over these 
accounts and orders defendant to do whatever is necessary to make 
plaintiff the custodian of said accounts. The Court further orders 
plaintiff to spend the funds from these accounts only for the 
benefit of the respective child who is the beneficiary of said 
account. 
38. Tax Returns. The Court rules that the parties should 
file separate tax returns for the year 1993. Plaintiff should be 
entitled to claim Jason and Tawna as income tax exemptions and 
defendant should be entitled to claim Tricia as an income tax 
exemption beginning in 1993, provided he remains current on all of 
the obligations of alimony, child support and other support set 
forth herein. The parties should sign such IRS or state forms or 
documents as may be necessary to insure that each receives the 
above-specified exemptions. 
39. Income Tax Liability. The Court finds because defendant 
prepared the parties' joint income tax returns and claimed many 
business deductions in an attempt to minimize taxable income and 
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because plaintiff had no expertise or participation in the 
preparation in said income tax returns other than signing her name, 
defendant is ordered to indemnify and hold plaintiff harmless for 
any past due taxes, penalties, interest or other monies which may 
be assessed against her by any governmental entity in connection 
with said joint tax returns. 
40. Attorney's Fees. The Court finds that plaintiff's 
attorney's fees and costs for this divorce action are approximately 
$28,700. This amount includes the fees from plaintiff's first 
attorneys, Campbell, Maack & Sessions; plaintiff's second attorney, 
Richard Bigelow; and plaintiff's third attorney, Paul S. Felt, as 
well as each attorney's supporting staff. The Court finds that 
plaintiff's attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $27,800 are 
reasonable and necessary based upon the testimony or proffer by 
each of plaintiff's attorneys as to his expertise in the field of 
domestic relations law, his hourly fee being customary and standard 
in the area, the type of work performed, the need for such work and 
written detail of the hours spent by attorneys and staff working on 
the case, as well as the complex nature of this case which included 
understanding and tracing many of the defendant's overseas and 
domestic investments. The Court further finds that plaintiff has 
no ability to pay these attorney's fees without the award of the 
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assets to her as set forth in these Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The Court further finds that defendant is 
being awarded substantial assets in this divorce and has other 
undisclosed foreign assets and thus has ability to assist plaintiff 
with payment of her attorney's fees and would be ordered to do so 
but for the award of the greater share of the domestic assets of 
the parties to plaintiff. Therefore, the Court rules that based on 
the distribution of the domestic marital assets, each party is 
ordered to pay his or her own attorney's fees and costs. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has previously awarded plaintiff a Decree of 
Divorce from defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
2. Custody and visitation of the parties' minor children 
should be awarded as set forth in Finding of Fact number 4 above. 
3. Defendant should be ordered to pay child support to 
plaintiff as set forth in Finding of Fact number 21 above. 
4. Defendant should be ordered to pay alimony to plaintiff 
as set forth in FJ i 1 i ii'j " f r \ '^'number 17- nt -T* ' 6 
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5. The real and personal property and assets of the parties
 ff , 
should be awarded as set forth \x\ SSUid-JnKjbi of Taofe nuirfbers 2yt 27, ^ 
2%-j—22-r-»0, 31,-(32, 33, 35, 30 and- W aboud, r 
6. The defendant should be ordered to maintain health 
insurance on the children of the parties and make health insurance 
available to plaintiff under the COBRA law as set forth in Finding 
of Fact number 33 above, ^  J-Ocffk*"^ ty fa' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
7. ThenPikaintirf f sh^ u3^ di bey^ Jwacd^ d 0<?stp4vy£nj* oejhttfoly oyer 
thej 
hi! 
8. Each party should be 'SfrdfeSred to p6y hi^ or her own 
attorney's fees and costs. 
9. The parties should be ordered to file separate tax 
returns for 1993 with claimed exemptions as set forth in Finding of 
Fact number 37 above. 
10. The Court will seal the file, pursuant to Section 30-3-4, 
Utah Code Ann., upon stipulation of the parties, subsequent to 
entry of a final Decree. 
Dated this _day of May, 1993. 
LESaiE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the 
following, this fl!^ day of May, 1993: 
Paul S. Felt 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
79 S. Main, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David A. McPhie 
Attorney for Defendant 
2105 E. Murray Holladay Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
